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Abstract
In speculative markets, risk-free profit opportunities are eliminated by traders
exploiting them. Markets are therefore often described as “informationally
efficient”, rapidly removing predictable price changes, and leaving only residual
unpredictable fluctuations. This classical view of markets absorbing information
and otherwise operating close to an equilibrium is challenged by extreme price
fluctuations, in particular since they occur far more frequently than can be
accounted for by external news. Here we show that speculative markets which
absorb mainly self-generated information can exhibit both: evolution towards
efficient equilibrium states as well as their subsequent destabilization. This
peculiar dynamics, a generic instability arising from an adaptive control which
annihilates predictable information, is realized in a minimal agent-based market
model where the impacts of agents’ strategies adapt according to their trading
success. This adaptation implements a learning rule for the market as a whole
minimizing predictable price changes. The model reproduces stylized statistical
properties of price changes in quantitative detail, including heavy tailed log
return distributions and volatility clusters. Our results demonstrate that the
perpetual occurrence of market instabilities can be a direct consequence of the
very mechanisms that lead to market efficiency.
Social systems self-organize. In consequence, collective behaviors can emerge that appear to
pursue a common goal which is actually not present in the behavior of the single agents (1).
The view that markets in fact operate in distinguished equilibrium states became influential
in economics (2). Here, a fundamental hypothesis is that markets operate informationally
optimal. That is, prices are assumed to ”fully reflect available information” (3), or at
least come close to this limit (4), such that risk-free (arbitrage) profits cannot be made
by (re-)using said information. If true, one of the implications of this ”Efficient Market
Hypothesis” (EMH) is that resulting prices fluctuate randomly (5).
Empirical findings in favor of the Efficient Market Hypothesis include the general absence
of exploitable autocorrelations among price changes in financial markets (6). The magnitudes
of price changes (”volatilities”), however, are correlated for long periods of time. That is,
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large price changes are typically followed by large ones and small changes by small ones,
indicating that markets are complex dynamical systems involving long memories (7, 8).
Furthermore, logarithmic price changes (log returns) exhibit large fluctuations even in the
absence of external news (9, 10), contradicting naive expectations for systems in stable
equilibria. More precisely, log return distributions exhibit heavy tails where events that are
many times bigger than the standard deviation occur at a much higher frequency than what
would be expected if they were Gaussian distributed (7, 11) (Fig. 1 (c)). These so-called
stylized facts of price time series hint at underlying dynamics that are substantially self-
referential (12). They were associated either with herding effects (13), “bubbles”, or with
the interactions of heterogeneous traders with limited rationality (14) in a market exactly
at a critical point (15).
Here we investigate whether the apparent antinomy of stabilizing information efficient
control and dynamics resembling systems operating close to criticality can be resolved by a
recent non-economic theory (16): It was shown that adaptive control of a dynamical system
can generically lead to an instability where the susceptibility to noise dramatically increases
close to the point of perfect balance. This principle applies to markets if two requirements
are fulfilled: First, markets have to absorb information about predictable price changes.
Ideally, this property should hold independently of the rationality of the individual traders,
which cannot be guaranteed. Second, a self-referential market needs to become susceptible
to residual noise once all locally relevant information has been exploited.
The first property is a rather common view in economics. If a profit opportunity is present,
investors will increasingly exploit it until their price impacts cancel said opportunity. For
example, if a certain stock is priced too low, traders will increase buy orders and thereby raise
its price. The second property is also intuitive. As traders try to detect trends or patterns in
the price dynamics, they effectively predict how the market reacts to available information.
However, once the agents’ actions have led to a balanced equilibrium, it becomes increasingly
difficult to distinguish predictable price fluctuations from random noise. If traders then act
upon the random fluctuations as if they would hold meaningful new information, their
actions will not be balanced anymore. That is, it may be impossible to predict whether a
group of traders overreact to the supposed new information and to attenuate the resulting
price jump by exploiting it. Therefore, atypically large price movements may become much
more likely than expected for a Gaussian distribution.
3
The Model
As a concrete example of the fundamental dynamical instability arising from information
absorption as it may be realized in financial markets, we introduce a minimal agent-based
trading model. Each agent is representative of one trading strategy and possesses two types
of assets which are called money and stocks in the following. For simplicity, we consider a
coarse-grained price time series where one step could be considered as e.g. a day. In each
time step, every agent either buys or sells an amount of stocks. The fraction of an agent’s
money that is used to buy stocks or vice versa is denoted by the use parameter γ. At each
time t, all trades are performed at the same price p(t) which is determined from the ratio of
total demand and supply. Hence, trading per se conserves the total amounts of each asset,
money and stocks.
Agents base their decisions on public information states. In each time step t one of D
possible states, which is denoted by an index µ(t) ∈ {1, . . . , D}, is conveyed to the agents.
Each agent’s decision to either buy or sell is fixed in time for each µ and assigned at random.
We consider two different methods for the generation of these information states:
For endogenous information, agents possess a memory of the most recent K signs of the
log returns which indicate whether the prices p(t−K), . . . , p(t) decreased or increased with
respect to their predecessor. This information can take one out of D = 2K possible states.
For exogenous information, µ(t) are drawn randomly and independently with probability
Pext(µ). Unless stated otherwise all µ have equal probabilities Pext(µ) = 1/D. We also
investigated mixed information and obtained results similar to the endogenous case (see
supplement).
We focus on markets that are dominated by speculators who can win or loose assets only
by betting on price changes within the market. To investigate the effect of a small number of
traders that convey new assets to the market or draw out their profits, we divide the agents
into Ns speculators and Np producers. Producers’ resources by definition stay constant.
Thus, speculators only redistribute their wealth and are competitive whereas producers
provide a predictable supply of liquidity and stocks. All agents are initially provided with
equal amounts of assets.
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FIG. 1: Analysis of log returns r(t + 1) = log p(t+ 1) − log p(t), where p(t) is the price at time
step t. (a): Time series of the trading model with uniformly distributed exogenous information.
Parameters: Ns = 2
10, Np = 0, D = 2
9, γ = 0.8. (b): Time series for the same model, but
with endogenous information. (c): Complementary cumulative distribution function of log return
magnitudes obtained by rank ordering. Dotted black: The same simulation as in (a). Solid
black: the same simulation as in (b). Dashed red: Daily returns for the Dow Jones Industrial
Average (DJIA) since 1900. Short grey line: Hill estimator for the scaling exponent ξ of the
black curve, where large returns show power-law scaling P (|r| > x) ∝ x−ξ. The cutoff optimizes
the Kolmogorov–Smirnov statistic (16). For a fair comparison, 3 · 104 time steps after transients
were analyzed for the simulations to match the length of the Dow Jones time series. Each time
series was normalized by dividing by its standard deviation. (d): Autocorrelations of the log-
return magnitudes |r|. Line styles are identical to (c). Positive autocorrelations for the model with
endogenous information, and the DIJA persist for more than 2 years.
Stylized Facts
Log-return time series for the model with exogenous information are shown in Fig. 1 (a).
A strong reduction of initial fluctuations is observed leaving only a narrow band of Gaussian
distributed returns after the transient. Fig. 1 (b) shows the endogenous case. Here, in
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contrast, initial return magnitudes are reduced only in the mean. The magnitudes of the few
most extreme returns, however, are less reduced. The remaining fluctuations are analyzed in
Fig. 1 (c), where cumulative distributions of return magnitudes are shown for both cases and
compared to the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA). The latter serves as an example for
a typical price time series. For the endogenous case, the distribution tail is well described by
a power-law and in good agreement with the DJIA. Return fluctuations in the endogenous
case also tend to form clusters in time. This effect is quantified by long-range temporal
correlations of return magnitudes shown in Fig. 1 (d) and is also consistent with the DJIA.
Dynamics with Exogenous Information
To understand the model dynamics, we first consider the exogenous case which is fully
analytically tractable. The rules of asset redistribution by trading are equivalent to a learning
rule related to gradient descent, allowing for the market as a whole to minimize predictable
price changes. The reason for this stabilizing control is that trading success increases the
impact of agents whose actions contribute to a reduction of price fluctuations. A phase
transition with respect to the critical parameter α = D/Ns is identified at α = 1/2, the
point where random binary vectors (the agents) with positive weights (the assets) form a
complete basis in the D-dimensional strategy space in the limit Ns →∞. Beyond this point,
a speculative market without producers evolves the distribution of assets onto a manifold
where the price is invariant to trading. That is, agents still trade and exchange assets, but
the price remains constant. Markets that include producers still exhibit finite returns also
for α < 1/2. Otherwise, for Np ≪ Ns, return distributions only depend weakly on Np. See
Fig. 3, and the supplementary material for more details.
Information Annihilation Instability
When the µ(t) are endogenously generated, the same mechanism of information absorp-
tion present in the exogenous case ensures that the system relaxes towards local price equi-
libria and returns vanish, but only transiently. Fig. 2 (a) shows the price time series for a
simulation with a very small use γ which formally is a learning rate. At any point in time,
the system moves towards a certain price which characterizes a local equilibrium. As the
6
0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
pr
ic
e
(a)
×104steps
23700 23900 24100
1.00
1.05
1.10
1.15
pr
ic
e
(b)
steps
FIG. 2: (a): Price time series with a very slow rate of resource redistribution (use) γ = 0.01. Other
parameters: N = 210, Np = 2
4, D = 29. (b): A zoom in on the time series shown in (a).
system approaches this equilibrium, price fluctuations are reduced. These fluctuations gen-
erally consist of complex oscillations like the one shown in Fig. 2 (b). The equilibria become
unstable once all predictable information is exploited by the speculators. Then, even little
overshooting of the adaptation dynamics or noise can lead to price changes corresponding
to information states that were not predicted by patterns in the immediate past. Because
the market is not well-adapted to these new states, the possibility of large price changes
increases dramatically. Compared to (16), we here discovered an instability due to informa-
tion annihilation in a mathematically different way, which demonstrates that this concept
is even more general.
For larger γ, this behavior is not as obvious: time series appear random and distinct
oscillations are rarely visually recognizable (Fig. 1 (b)). Still, phase diagrams from extensive
simulations demonstrate that return distributions are largely unaffected by these effects over
wide ranges of γ: Fig. 3 (a) shows how much initial mean log return magnitudes are reduced
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FIG. 3: (a): reduction of average return magnitudes during transients and (b): kurtosis of log-
returns of the model with endogenous information for different α vs γ. A kurtosis of 3 corresponds
to a normal distribution. Here, the system size is set constant at Ns = 2
10 speculators and Np = 2
4
producers. For each time series, 2 · 107 time steps were simulated. Reductions are measured as
the ratio between the mean log-return magnitudes during the first 10 and the last 107 timesteps.
The kurtoses were calculated for the last 107 timesteps. Simulations were performed on a grid, all
axis ticks correspond to node positions. For each node on the grid, 50 time series were analyzed
and results were averaged. Values in between nodes were obtained by linear interpolation after
logarithmizing the values at each node. Color mapping was performed on the log-values, contour
line labels are the actual values for variances and kurtoses. For α ≤ 1/2, the kurtoses reach extreme
values that can not be reliably estimated from finite time series. Therefore, the color scale in (b)
was set to not extend to values above 100.
for different α and γ; Fig. 3 (b) shows the impacts that infrequent extreme returns have
on the remaining variances, which are measured by kurtoses after transients. The stronger
the reduction of return magnitudes (Fig. 3 (a)), the heavier tailed the return distributions
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are (Fig. 3 (b)). Therefore, a clear link between information annihilation and extreme
returns is established in our model for the whole parameter space. This relation between
return reduction and kurtosis is not found for exogenous information drawn from a uniform
distribution (Fig. 1 (b), and supplement).
Surprising Information Causes Large Returns
We find that large returns are caused by information states that have not occurred for a
long time. Intuitively, such states are more surprising and therefore carry more information
than the ones visited more recently – a concept that is closely related to Shannon informa-
tion. The more surprising an information state is, the higher the corresponding log return.
The correlation between log return magnitudes and the times τ that have passed since the
respective information states occurred last is shown in Fig. 4 (solid line) for endogenous
information. Here, the absorption of local information in combination with rare jumps leads
to a strongly inhomogeneous distribution of visiting frequencies over the information set:
the probability distribution P (τ) is power-law tailed with an exponent of approximately 2.5
(see supplement). This suggests that the self-reflexive dynamics for endogenous informa-
tion generates a characteristic distribution of information states that ultimately underlies
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FIG. 4: Correlation of return magnitudes |r| with the time τ since the corresponding information
states occurred last. Model parameters: D = 210, Ns = 2
11, Np = 0, γ = 0.5. Simulation length:
T = 2 · 107; the first T/2 timesteps were discarded for the analysis. Black line: Endogenous
information. Dashed line: Exogenous information with Pexo(µ) ∝ exp(−0.02µ), leading to P (τ) ∝
τ−2. Both lines are averages over 10 simulations.
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extreme price fluctuations. We tested this hypothesis by using inhomogeneously distributed
exogenous information states leading to similarly distributed τ . Then, as in the endogenous
case, return magnitudes are strongly correlated with τ (Fig. 4, dashed line).
Discussion
Our model demonstrates that even a simple yet plausible mechanism of order size adap-
tation suffices to coordinate the impacts of diverse strategies such that information becomes
completely absorbed in the price. The proof that the trading rules in our model correspond
to an efficient gradient based learning rule that minimizes predictable return magnitudes
provides a rigorous link of a fundamental market mechanism to adaptive control. We tested
variations of this mechanism including adaptations of individual agent use parameters, and
order-book based pricing (17); information absorption proved to be a robust property. We
therefore consider it highly plausible to prevail in real markets despite the complexities of
real pricing mechanisms and order size adaptations, as long as the latter correlate with
trading success.
“Rationality”, in the sense of an efficient adjustment of prices to new information, in our
model emerges from the collective behavior of many traders. We find that a minority rule
with respect to the returns is a dominating factor in its dynamics. That is, traders whose
actions counteract those of the majority profit most.
In the well known minority game (15) (MG), however, adaptation is based on the choices
of the participating agents, and a single-step payoff with respect to the excess demand. This
differs from our model where the market adapts traders’ impacts based on price changes,
and also over different time scales. Most importantly, the mechanism for herding previously
discussed for MGs is a breakdown of the efficient coordination of agents in overcomplete
markets where they become too correlated. This leads to an increase of average fluctuations
and does not depend on how the information conveyed to the agents is generated.
In contradistinction, the instability due to adaptive control is independent of microscopic
interactions and in fact was first realized in a one-dimensional random map (18). The
heavy tailed distributions here are a direct consequence of the elimination of local trends or
patterns which yields a net decrease in average fluctuation magnitudes. These fluctuations
are therefore a sign of high efficiency and do not signal its breakdown: they reflect surprising
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information. Furthermore, a closed loop involving endogenous information is essential for
creating this instability leading to extreme fluctuations that are not caused by external
events. Therefore, the results presented in this paper are complementary to the published
findings based on MGs in several respects. It is, however, possible to formulate a minority
game corresponding to our model, but that would go beyond the scope of this paper.
The fact that efficient information annihilation does not result in a unique and stable
equilibrium, but instead can lead to local states that perpetually become unstable, provides
a new and comprehensive solution to a long standing antinomy in economics where both no-
tions have been considered mutually exclusive (14). Furthermore, our adaptive agent-based
model not only demonstrates the theoretical principle of information annihilation instability,
but can reproduce important “stylized facts” of financial markets also quantitatively to a
surprising extent. The parameter sets that best reproduce the data correspond to situations
where agents on average profit most (see supplement). This is plausible because real traders
can choose among different markets. These findings suggest that the information annihila-
tion instability is indeed one of the main causes of the notorious large jumps in price time
series, particularly in strongly speculative markets. An empirical confirmation of our theory
would require identifying the information states that cause large price changes in a given
market, for which it then makes directly testable predictions.
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I. SUPPLEMENTARY METHODS
A. Model
Each agent i = 1, . . . , N possesses two types of assets which without loss of generality are
called money Mi(t) and stocks Si(t). N is the total number of agents. In each round, every
agent places a market order to either buy or to sell an amount of stocks. Since trading
should conserve the amount of traded assets, the price in each round is determined by:
p(t) =
δ(t)
ς(t)
(1)
with demand δ and supply of stocks ς. This is a fair rule that could be used in a real market
with only market orders.
For a market including stochastic limit orders gathered over some period of time, consider
the hypothetical price p∗(t) at which trades would take place if all agents scaled their orders
by a common factor. Then the volume would change, but to preserve market clearing the
price is not affected; that is p(t)∗ = p(t). Therefore, the price is a function of the ratio of
demand and supply. After linearization of this function for small small excess demands the
price is proportional to the aforementioned ratio which justifies this choice of the pricing
rule also as an approximation of the mean prices obtained from limit orders.
Agents base their decisions on a public information state. In each time step one of D
possible states, which is denoted by an index µ(t), is conveyed to the agents. We distinguish
two different methods for the generation of these information states at each time step t:
For exogenous information, µ(t) are independent identically distributed random variates
drawn from a distribution Pext(µ).
For endogenous information, agents possess a memory of the most recent K signs of the
log returns. To eliminate the possibility of a lock, signs for vanishing returns are chosen at
random. This information can take one out of D = 2K possible states:
µ(t+ 1) =
(
2µ(t) + Θ(r(t) + η)
)
mod D (2)
where Θ denotes the Heaviside step function and η is an arbitrarily small symmetric random
variable with zero mean. Simulation results do not depend on Var(η) as long as it is small
enough.
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Each agent’s i consequent decision is now determined by a strategy vector whose elements
σµi are drawn randomly out of {0, 1} once and then kept constant. These two possible deci-
sions correspond to trading an amount mi(t) of money or an amount si(t) of stocks for the
respective other asset in the next round. Orders are placed with a constant use parameter γ:
Case σ
µ(t)
i = 1 (agent i buys stocks):
mi(t) = γMi(t) (3)
si(t) = 0
Case σ
µ(t)
i = 0 (agent i sells stocks):
mi(t) = 0
si(t) = γ Si(t) (4)
Demand and supply are the sums of all buy and sell orders respectively
δ(t) =
N∑
i=1
mi(t) + ǫ (5)
ς(t) =
N∑
i=1
si(t) + ǫ (6)
where ǫ is a small positive number. This ensures that prices and returns are always well
defined. The cases with zero demand or supply are, however, irrelevant for all practical
purposes. A sufficiently small ǫ≪ 10−3 does not influence simulation results to a meaningful
degree. All figures were generated using ǫ = 10−10.
We investigate the effect of a market ecology by dividing the agents into Ns speculators
and Np = N−Ns producers. We focus on markets that are dominated by speculators whose
resources are redistributed due to trading:
Mk(t + 1) = Mk(t)−mk(t) + sk(t) p(t)
Sk(t+ 1) = Sk(t)− sk(t) +mk(t)/p(t)

Np < k <= N. (7)
Producers’ resources stay constant throughout the game:
Mj(t) = Mj(0)
Sj(t) = Sj(0)

 j < Np. (8)
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Thus, only speculators redistribute their wealth and are competitive whereas producers
provide a predictable supply of liquidity and stocks. All agents are initially provided with
equal amounts of resources Mi(0) = Si(0) = 1.
B. Invariant Manifold
We show, that if one distribution of resources (M,S) = (M 1, . . . ,MN , S1, . . . , SN) exists
for which the price p(M,S, µ) = p is independent of the information µ, this price is invariant
with respect to any resource redistribution due to trading in a purely speculative market.
That is, there is a manifold Q = {(M ′, S′) | p(M ′, S′, µ) = p ∀ µ} of distributions of stocks
for which the price is independent of µ and this manifold is closed with respect to trading
according to Eq. (7). For the proof, assume that at some point in time the system is in a
suitable state such that
δ(M,µ)
ς(S, µ)
= p ∀ µ(t)⇔ (9)
δ(M,µ)− p ς(S, µ) =
γ
N∑
i=1
(
σµi M i − p (1− σµi )Si
)
= 0 ∀ µ(t). (10)
Then, denoting the distributions of stocks and money after trading by M
′
i and S
′
i we obtain:
1
γ
(
δ(M
′
, µ′)− p ς(S ′, µ′)
)
=
N∑
i=1
σµ
′
i M
′
i − p
N∑
i=1
(1− σµ′i )S
′
i (11)
=
N∑
i=1
σµ
′
i
(
M i − γ σµi M i + γ p (1− σµi )Si
)
− p
N∑
i=1
(1− σµ′i )
(
Si − γ (1− σµi )Si +
γ
p
σµi M i
)
(12)
=
N∑
i=1
(
σµ
′
i M i − p (1− σµ
′
i )Si
)
− γ
N∑
i=1
(
σµi M i − p (1− σµi )Si
)
(13)
= 0− 0 = 0 (14)
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FIG. S5: Average log-return variances for different values of α = D/Ns. The model with exogenous
information and only speculators serves as a reference. For comparison, simulations with a small
numbers of either deterministic (Np = 2
4) or random producers (Nn = 2
4) are shown as well
as as the model with endogenous information. Grey area: Analytical upper and lower limit for
exogenous information. Dark gray line: heuristic interpolation.
C. Completeness of the Strategies
As shown above, a sufficient condition for complete suppression of all price changes is
finding a resource distribution (M,S) for which the price is independent of the information.
That is,
p(µ,M, S) = p ∀ µ (15)
which is equivalent to Eq. (10). To fulfill this criterion, we need enough agents to form a
complete basis in the strategy space which has D dimensions. Then, the deviation from p
caused by each agent can be canceled by a superposition of the other agents for every µ.
This can be guaranteed if the number of speculators Ns exceeds 2D.
For an insufficient number of speculators, we can still calculate an upper and a lower
bound for the variance of the log returns given D and N for a perfect superposition of
speculators with exogenous information. Numerical and analytical results for this case are
shown in Fig. S5. The mean variance is found to drop dramatically at α = D/Ns = 1/2,
with an increasingly sharp transition for large D. This phase transition can be understood
by considering the probability that a random binary vector can be canceled by an optimal
superposition of N − 1 random binary vectors with positive weights. As an interim step,
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consider superpositions of random vectors with arbitrary weights. One such vector creates
a one dimensional subspace. Adding a second vector expands the dimensionality of the
subspace to d2 = 2 if it is linearly independent of the first one. Adding further vectors one
by one, the probability that the ith vector does not lie in a di−1-dimensional submanifold is
P (di = di−1 + 1) = 1− 2D−di−1 . (16)
We can therefore iteratively calculate the probability distribution P (dNs−1) of d after adding
Ns − 1 agents and the probability
P (dNs = dNs−1 + 1) =
D∑
d=1
P (d = dNs−1) (1− 2d−D) (17)
that one out of Ns agents is linearly independent of the others. If a vector is linearly inde-
pendent of the other agents in d dimensions, it cannot be canceled by a linear combination
of the other agents for all µ. However, it may still be possible to cancel this agent’s impact
for a subset of all possible µ, i.e. for a smaller subspace. Therefore, the probability that an
agent cannot be canceled in any given time step is
Pc.c. =
D∑
d=1
P (d = dNs−1) (1− 2d−D) (1−
d
D
). (18)
The last term weights each summand with the fraction of dimensions in which the agent’s
impact is not canceled. Finally, to relate the fraction of not canceled agents to returns we
need to consider the fluctuations prior to any resource redistribution. Since all strategies and
µ are chosen randomly, agents initially contribute to the demand or the supply at random.
These fluctuations of demand and supply then follow a binomial distribution with Ns trials
and equal probability for buying or selling:
δ ∝ B(Ns, 1/2) (19)
ς ∝ B(Ns, 1/2). (20)
Since
〈δ〉 = 〈ς〉 = Ns/2, and (21)
Var(δ) = Var(ς) = Ns/4 (22)
we can approximate the price for small deviations:
p =
N/2 + ∆δ
N/2−∆ς ≈ 1 + 2
∆δ −∆ς
Ns
. (23)
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Therefore,
〈p(0)〉 = 1, (24)
Var(p(0)) ≈ 4/Ns, (25)
and finally
〈r(0)〉 = 0, (26)
Var(r(0)) ≈ 8
Ns ln(10)2
, (27)
where the logarithm stems from using the logarithm with base 10 in the log return.
Combining Eqns. (18) and (27), we obtain the expected variance of the return for an
optimal superposition of agents without the positivity constraint on the resources
Var(rn.c.) = Var(r(0)) Pc.c.. (28)
Since resources cannot be negative, they form a positive cone. Each agent thatlocalized is
linear independent of the others spans a half space. Therefore, 2Ns agents are necessary
to completely span the strategy space. Yet for small numbers of agents, each agent still
represents a full degree of freedom since the probability that two agents lie on the same 1-
dimensional submanifold is vanishingly small. However, as the number of agents is increased
such that α→ 1, an increasingly large number of new agents just converts a halfspace into a
full one. Therefore, Eq. (28) represents a lower limit for the variance of the log returns which
is a good description for Ns ≪ D. An upper limit is obtained by changing Eq. (18) such,
that each agents increases d by 1/2. This is a good approximation for Ns ≈ 2D. The area in
between these limits is shown in Fig. S5 (gray shaded). The lower limit has a phase transition
at α = 1 while the upper limit has a phase transition at α = 1/2. A phase transition at α = 1
is already present in Eq. (17). The gradual convergence for the true variance of the system
from the lower to the upper limit is captured by a simple heuristic interpolation: For the
dark gray line in Fig. S5, the probability for a new linearly independent agent to increase d by
one is P1 = min(1, Ns/2
m+1) while the probability to increase d by 1/2 is P1/2 = 1−p1. The
presented theory describes the numerical results (Fig. S5) for the model with endogenous
information very well for α ≤ 1/2. For full markets, the residual error for simulations with
only speculators is determined by the numerical precision. When producers are present, the
residual error is noticeably higher. This is due to the fact, that producers push the system off
vii
the invariant manifold. This error is dependent on the agents’ use and vanishes for small γ.
Still, predictable producers are canceled much better than random ones because speculators
can successfully predict their choices. For endogenous information (D = 2K), the phase
transition appears smother and slightly shifted towards larger α. A stronger reduction of
average returns for α < 1/2 occurs due to the more localized adaptation: Agents do not
adapt to all possible values of µ at the same time.
D. Gradient Descent
We now investigate, how the system evolves towards the invariant manifold. We focus
on large numbers of agents and small γ. The resource redistribution due to subsequently
trading the two assets for one another is found to be a special case of a learning rule which
minimizes log-return magnitudes. Even more generally, we consider the error function
e = r2 (29)
and show that its gradient
∂e
∂X
= 2r
∂r
∂X
, X ∈ {M,S} (30)
with respect to the agents’ resources is dominated by terms with the opposite sign as the
change in the agents’ resources. Therefore, any scaling of the agents’ resources which keeps
the sign of the return for money and the opposite sign for stocks corresponds to minimizing
log return magnitudes similar to a gradient descent.
To begin with, consider two subsequent time steps where the information takes the values
µ and µ′. We again consider a market consisting of speculators only. The derivative of the
return with respect to the resources of an agent k is
∂r(M,S, µ, µ′)
∂Mk
=
σµ
′
k
δ′
− σ
µ
k
δ
+O(γ), (31)
∂r(M,S, µ, µ′)
∂Sk
=
1− σµk
ς
− 1− σ
µ′
k
ς ′
+O(γ), with (32)
δ = δ(M,µ), δ′ = δ(M ′, µ′), (33)
ς = ς(S, µ), ς ′ = ς(S ′, µ′). (34)
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The change in resources after trading twice is
∆Mk =M
′′
k −Mk = γ
(
Sk((1− σµk )p + (1− σµ
′
k )p
′)−Mk(σµ
′
k + σ
µ
k )
)
+O(γ2) (35)
∆Sk = S
′′
k − Sk = γ
(
Mk
(
σµ
′
k
p′
+
σµk
p
)
− Sk(2− σµk − σµ
′
k )
)
+O(γ2). (36)
We are interested in
∆rk =
(
∆Mk
∂r
∂Mk
+∆Sk
∂r
∂Sk
)
(37)
and continue only with leading terms in γ.
For now, we also assume that agents can only perform roundtrip trades (RT). The general
case will be discussed later. Two cases are left:
Case σµk (1− σµ
′
k ) = 1:
∆rRTk
γ
γ≪1≈ Mk − p
′Sk
δ
− Mk/p− Sk
ς ′
(38)
=
Mk
δ
(1− ς
ς ′
) +
Sk
ς ′
(1− δ
′
δ
) (39)
Case σµ
′
k (1− σµk ) = 1:
∆rRTk
γ
γ≪1≈ pSk −Mk
δ′
+
Mk/p
′ − Sk
ς ′
(40)
=
Mk
δ′
(
ς ′
ς
− 1) + Sk
ς
(
δ
δ′
− 1). (41)
Above, we used p = δ/ς and p′ = δ′/ς ′. Then,
1
γ
N∑
k=1
∆rRTk =
ς ′
ς
− ς
ς ′
+
δ
δ′
− δ
′
δ
(42)
=
ς ′
ς
(1− p
′
p
) +
ς
ς ′
(
p
p′
− 1)

 < 0, r > 0> 0, r < 0 . (43)
Therefore, the change in the total error function
N∑
k=1
(
∆Mk
∂r2
∂Mk
+∆Sk
∂r2
∂Sk
)
RT≤ 0 (44)
can never be positive if agents only perform roundtrip trades.
On average, this result holds even for the general case. The reason why we have to
consider averages is, that agents who buy or sell two times in a row always decrease the
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amount of money or stocks they own after two time steps. Therefore, these agents’ resources
are expected to change in the opposite direction of the gradient half of the time. That is,
for every given pair of informations (µ, µ′), a quarter of all agents’ is expected to have their
resources evolve such that future r(µ, µ′)2 increase. However, the actual influence of these
agents is much lower and can be neglected for large systems. Then, demand and supply can
be well described as binomial processes as shown above. Here, express demand and supply
as:
δ = N
2
+∆δ, 〈∆δ〉 = 0, 〈∆δ2〉 ≤ N
4
(45)
ς = N
2
+∆ς, 〈∆ς〉 = 0, 〈∆ς2〉 ≤ N
4
(46)
and the relative fluctuations around the mean demand N/2 are only
√
N/2 and therefore
small for large N. Thus we can expand Eq. (31) for small fluctuations:
∂r(M,S, µ, µ′)
∂Mk
≈ σµ′k
(
2
N
− 4∆δ
′
N2
)
− σµk
(
2
N
− 4∆δ
N2
)
(47)
∂r(M,S, µ, µ′)
∂Sk
≈ (1− σµk )
(
2
N
− 4∆ς
N2
)
− (1− σµ′k )
(
2
N
− 4∆ς
′
N2
)
. (48)
As the above equation shows, when agents perform roundtrip trades, they contribute a term
of order N−1 to the gradient with respect to each asset. When agents buy or sell twice,
they only contribute a term of order N−1.5 for one asset. Therefore, the influence of these
agents vanishes for sufficiently large N . By a similar argument, approximately a quarter of
all agents performs either one of the actions (buy, sell), (sell, buy), (buy, buy), and (sell,
sell) while fluctuations can be neglected for large N . Summing up, the expected change in
r(µ, µ′)2 over repeated trades with the same information〈
N∑
k=1
(
∆Mk
∂r2
∂Mk
+∆Sk
∂r2
∂Sk
)〉
(µ,µ′)
≤ 0. (49)
is always negative given a sufficiently large number of agents.
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II. SUPPLEMENTARY FIGURES
A. Phase Diagrams for Exogenous Information
For uniformly distributed exogenous information states, a reduction of fluctuations does
not generally increase the kurtosis (Fig. S6). This is opposed to the endogenous case shown
in Fig. 3 in the main paper. Only very large uses in overcomplete markets cause high
kurtoses. Then, even uniformly distributed µ occasionally are not repeated for a sufficiently
long time to be “forgotten” by the market.
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FIG. S6: (a): Reduction of average return magnitudes during transients, and (b): kurtoses for
the model with exogenous µ drawn from a uniform distribution. All other parameters and figure
generation are identical to Fig. 3 in the main paper.
xi
B. Speculators and Producers
Fig. S7 shows the phase diagram for α versus the amount of producers in the market. As it
turns out, a second phase transition with respect to the number of producers is found. This
transition is independent of the one for the speculators. Small Np < 0.5 · D only weakly
influence return distributions.
102.4 21.3 4.6 1.0 0.2
D/Np
0.2
0.4
1.0
2.5
6.3
α
=
D
/
N s
(a)
102.4 21.3 4.6 1.0 0.2
D/Np
0.2
0.4
1.0
2.5
6.3
α
=
D
/
N s
(b)
FIG. S7: (a): Reduction of average return magnitudes during transients, and (b): kurtosis of
log-returns of the model with endogenous information for different numbers of speculators Ns and
producers Np for constant memory K = 10 (i.e. D = 2
10) and use γ = 0.5.
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C. Distribution of Information Ages (Surprise)
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FIG. S8: Complementary cumulative distribution of the times τ(t) since the informations µ(t)
occurred last. Solid black line: Model with intrinsic information and D = 210, Ns = 2
11, Np = 0,
γ = 0.5. Short red line: Hill estimator. Dashed line: Exogenous information with Pexo(µ) ∝
exp(−0.02µ), leading to P (τ) ∝ τ−2.
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D. Mixed Information
For a combination of endo- and exogenous information, results are similar to pure endoge-
nous information as long as the endogenous part dominates. Generally, more exogenous
information leads to a stronger reduction of fluctuations, less pronounced volatility cluster-
ing, and random time series without visible patterns even for small γ. The scaling of the
remaining extreme returns remains unchanged. An example is shown in Fig. S9.
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FIG. S9: Simulation for a model with 3 bits of uniform exogenous information and 6 bits of
endogenous information. Ns = 2
10, Np = 0, γ = 0.1. The first 2
7 time steps were discarded. Log
returns rn are normalized by their standard deviation. (a): Time series (b): Solid black line:
complementary cumulative distribution function. Short Red line: Hill estimator for the scaling
exponent. Dashed grey line: normal distribution.
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III. SUPPLEMENTARY DISCUSSION: INCOME AND THE CRITICAL POINT
Fig. S10 shows the phase transition with respect to α in more detail. As in Fig. S5, we
take one parameter set as a reference to which we compare simulations after transients
for different parameters. For orientation, the log-return variances (Fig. S10 (a)) and kur-
toses(Fig. S10 (b)), which have been discussed earlier, are shown again.
Mean speculator capitals
Cs(t) =
1
2Ns
Ns∑
k=1
Mk(t) + Sk(t). (50)
are not constant over time in markets that include producers. For empty markets, the
ratio of average speculator and producer capitals quickly evolves towards an equilibrium.
The more agents are added, the longer it takes for Cs to saturate. For critical or crowded
markets a positive speculator income persists over long times. Then, average speculator
capitals after transients can be well described as:
Cs(t)
2 = Cs(t0)
2 + a t, t0 < t. (51)
The income factor a is shown in Fig. S10 (c) and quantifies how well the speculators can
exploit the producers. a is found to be independent of the initial ratio between speculator
and producer capitals. It becomes maximal close to the critical point which can be intu-
itively understood: For empty markets, there is a finite chance for a producer strategy to
lie outside of the space spanned by the speculators. Therefore, increasing the number of
speculators increases their average income. For crowded markets, producers are already op-
timally exploited. Then, adding more speculators just distributes the maximal total income
over more of them. An analogous maximum can be found in Minority Games (see e.g. ref.
15 in the main paper).
Fig. S10 (d) shows the gini index, a common measure of wealth inequality. Increased
incomes coincide with increased capital inequality among speculators as the gini-index shows
a maximum at the critical point. Thus, only few speculators are most successful in exploiting
the producers.
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* D = 210, Np = 24, Cs(0) = Cf = 1, T = 107
Reference*
Cs(0) = .01
Cs(0) = 10
Cf = .64
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FIG. S10: Properties of log-return and resource distributions depend on the parameter α = D/Ns.
Solid line: The model with unity (initial) speculator and producer capitals Cs and Cp and a small
number of producers serves as a reference. Shown are averages from 50 simulations for each of
which only the last T = 107 out of 2T timesteps have been analyted. (a): variances and (b):
kurtoses were calculated from log-returns. (c): income factors a according to Eqns. (50) and (51).
(d) gini indices for speculator capitals after 2T timesteps. For each other line or symbol, only one
model parameters has been changed, respectively.
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